



Director of
Central
Intelligence

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031000030002-2

Top Secret




25X1

National Intelligence Daily (Cable)

10 January 1979

State Dept. review completed

Top Secret



25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031000030002-2

Copy 613


25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031000030002-2

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031000030002-2

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031000030002-2



National Intelligence Daily (Cable)



25X1

Contents

Briefs and Comments

Namibia: <i>UN Representative's Visit</i>	1
Nigeria: <i>Threat to Transition</i>	2
Jamaica: <i>Demonstrations</i>	3
Djibouti-China: <i>Diplomatic Relations</i>	3

25X1




Special Analysis

Vietnam-Kampuchea: <i>Hanoi's Prospects</i>	5
Overnight Reports.	7

25X1



25X1



Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031000030002-2

25X1

BRIEFS AND COMMENTS

NAMIBIA: UN Representative's Visit

Martti Ahtisaari, the UN Secretary General's special representative for Namibia, will go to Windhoek later this week to discuss with the South African Administrator General the problems blocking implementation of the UN independence program. Ahtisaari's mission will test whether South Africa, in order to gain international support for a Namibian government, will drop its demands for modifications in the UN program that probably would be unacceptable to the Security Council.

25X1

South African Prime Minister Botha has agreed to a UN-supervised election in Namibia that would, in effect, nullify the election conducted by the South Africans last month. There is, however, still a wide separation between the conditions demanded by the South Africans and the stipulations of the UN program. Among other things, the South Africans still insist that they will withdraw no troops until they are satisfied that the South-West Africa People's Organization has ceased all guerrilla operations. The UN plan stipulates that South African and SWAPO forces withdraw simultaneously within three months of a truce. The two sides apparently also still differ on the size of the planned UN peace-keeping force.

25X1

Ahtisaari's trip to Namibia challenges Botha to make a quick decision to accept at least an advance contingent of UN soldiers on the premise that remaining problems will be resolved later. Secretary General Waldheim has informed Botha that a UN force must begin arriving by late February if Botha's goal of an election by September is to be reconciled with the UN plan.

25X1

If Botha agrees to the early arrival of a first UN contingent, he will still hold high cards. All Namibian political groups except SWAPO share his wariness of UN "partiality" for SWAPO and may back the government in its efforts to limit the actual deployments of UN soldiers and the activities of the UN civil staff.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031000030002-2

NIGERIA: Threat to Political Transition

Last month we reported that ethnic and regional divisions were threatening the process that is supposed to culminate in the restoration of civilian rule in October. We are now becoming increasingly doubtful that the changeover will in fact take place. [REDACTED]

25X1

The country's new political parties are showing themselves prone to the same regional, ethnic, and religious lines of conflict that undermined the first republic in the 1960s. Interparty differences seem to be growing sharper. Regional and national elections scheduled to be held during the year are not likely to be peaceful. There probably will not be a clear-cut presidential victor. [REDACTED]

25X1

There is a growing chance--particularly if ethnic politicking triggers communal violence--that the transition will be aborted at some point during the year, either by the present military regime or by disgruntled officers in the Army. [REDACTED]

25X1

A civilian government would be less able than the military to cope with the ethnic and regional divisions and with the growing economic and social tensions arising from helter-skelter economic development, urban growth, and inflation. Events could well convince the military that it alone is capable of governing the country. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

JAMAICA: Demonstrations

Jamaica's opposition party on Monday launched demonstrations that have disrupted urban business activity and may have partly shut down the bauxite industry--the nation's leading foreign-exchange earner. The protest could escalate into a general strike before its scheduled end on Friday. The demonstrations are the most effective opposition action since Prime Minister Manley was elected nearly seven years ago and come at the lowest point in his popularity. The opposition's eventual aim is to force an early election on Manley, whom most Jamaicans blame for the country's severe economic downturn.

DJIBOUTI-CHINA: Diplomatic Relations

China and Djibouti earlier this week established diplomatic relations and agreed to exchange ambassadors as quickly as possible. For the Djibouti Government, the decision is clearly an effort to balance the diplomatic presence recently established by the USSR. Djibouti President Gouled, who only reluctantly acceded to strong and persistent pressure from Moscow for diplomatic ties, suspects the Soviets will seek to undermine his fragile regime as well as that of neighboring Somalia and attempt to pave the way for increased Ethiopian influence in Djibouti. China has the same concerns and will attempt to use Gouled's worries to advance its own anti-Soviet policies in the Horn of Africa.

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031000030002-2

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031000030002-2

25X1

SPECIAL ANALYSIS

VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA: Hanoi's Prospects

Vietnam's rapid imposition of a puppet regime in Phnom Penh and its extended offensive throughout the country are designed to crush all organized resistance in the shortest possible time. The outcome--the rapid establishment of total Vietnamese control or a debilitating guerrilla struggle--should become clearer within a month. In any case, the Vietnamese now appear committed to a protracted military occupation of Kampuchea, whatever the cost.

25X1

In reaching their decision to proceed with an all-out offensive and military occupation of Kampuchea, the Vietnamese appear to have banked heavily on being able quickly to destroy the forces of the Pol Pot regime and prevent the emergence of an effective Kampuchean resistance. If this can be done, Hanoi probably reasons that the cost of an all out offensive will prove to be no more than that of the previous unending border war.

25X1

If Prime Minister Pol Pot and other leaders are dead or otherwise removed from the scene, the Kampuchean resistance could quickly fade.

25X1

25X1

If the Kampuchean leaders can establish and maintain effective communications, they might bring considerable pressure to bear on the widely dispersed Vietnamese forces.

25X1

25X1

Vietnam will probably have to garrison at least six to eight divisions in Kampuchea for some time to control major cities and lines of communication. This kind of commitment, added to the 30,000 Vietnamese soldiers engaged in anti-insurgent operations in Laos, could in time place a serious strain on Vietnam's military and economic resources--a strain that could be aggravated if Western sources of aid dry up in the wake of Vietnam's open aggression. This clearly is a cost Hanoi is prepared to pay, if necessary, and Vietnamese determination probably is buttressed by a commitment of Soviet support.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031000030002-2

The extent and duration of Vietnam's military involvement in Kampuchea will also depend on the progress Vietnam's Khmer clients make in developing an independent military capability and an administrative infrastructure throughout the country. The government established in Phnom Penh on Monday--and recognized yesterday by the USSR--is headed by the same man, Heng Samrin, who was named as leader of the insurgent "national front." Some members of the new government were adherents of the Pol Pot regime who broke away over issues of policy or power during the last year.

25X1

The Chinese will do what they can to ensure that the Vietnamese occupation develops into a serious, long-term drain on Hanoi's resources. It may be some time, however, before the Chinese are able to assess the needs of any resistance force and begin to provide material support. Thai willingness to cooperate with the Chinese in such an endeavor is still in doubt.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031000030002-2

OVERNIGHT REPORTS

(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not been coordinated within the intelligence community. They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current Operations with analyst comment where possible from the production offices of NFAC.)

India

Candidates representing former Prime Minister Gandhi's Congress Party won decisive victories last night in two parliamentary byelections, the first held since her one-week imprisonment last month and her expulsion from parliament--where the Janata Party of Prime Minister Desai continues to have an overwhelming majority. The contests were in the south-central state of Andhra Pradesh, long a Gandhi stronghold. The margins of victory in each case were much greater than those garnered there by Congress candidates when the Janata Party won the national election in 1977; neither Janata candidate campaigned very effectively on this occasion. [REDACTED]

25X1

Peru

The general strike begun yesterday at the instigation of leftist labor groups has been a good deal less effective than its backers had hoped. The strike organizers, led by the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers, have failed to paralyze Lima's mass transit, and most mine and metallurgical workers in the provinces have refused to go on strike. The stern measures of the government, including the suspension of constitutional guarantees, have reduced support for the strike.

Egypt

According to the US Embassy, President Sadat has made clear that he once again regards former War Minister Jamasi as one of his senior advisers. Jamasi has in Sadat's entourage for talks with a US Congressman at Aswan last weekend, although he did not take an active part in the discussion. While it is not certain what specific functions Sadat has in mind for Jamasi, the



25X1



Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031000030002-2


President did give precedence to him over Defense Minister Ali in referring to possible participants in a US-Egyptian assessment of the Middle East - African situation Sadat has proposed. Jamasi, who lost his defense portfolio in a shakeup of Sadat's inner circle last October, indicated his pleasure at having been rehabilitated.

25X1



25X1


25X1



25X1

Top Secret

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031000030002-2



Top Secret

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031000030002-2